Applications of Bayesianism to Traditional Epistemology

Requirements

Five Problems*      March 11: Problems Due
Term Paper Presentation (10% of grade)   May 6: Presentation Day
Term Paper (90% of grade)    May 11**: Draft Due
                             May 18**: Paper Due

* The five problems are any five of your choosing from the Skyrms and Titelbaum readings. This is a pass/fail exercise; you just have to do it. Choose some problems that will challenge you! And you’re encouraged to do lots more problems!

** If you are taking an incomplete, you may turn in a draft of your paper as late as May 15 and your final paper as late as June 8.

Materials

All course materials, including books, are available in PDF in the Canvas site course folder. We will be reading from two books:

   Strevens, *Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory*
   Titelbaum, *Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology*

Tentative Schedule

Part I: The Basics

January 21 (Miriam): *Beliefs and Degrees of Belief*
   Strevens Chapters 1 and 2
   Buchak, “Belief, Credence and Norms”

January 28 (Sinan): *Probability and Conditionalization*
   Strevens Chapters 3 and 4
   Skyrms, “The Probability Calculus” (Ch. 6 of *Choice and Chance*)
   Titelbaum Chapters 2 and 3 (optional)

February 4 (Sinan): *Confirmation*
   Strevens Chapters 5 and 6
   Titelbaum Chapters 4.1–4.2 and 5.3–5.5 (optional)
Feb 11 (Miriam): *Induction and the Ravens Paradox*  
Strevens Chapters 7 and 8  
Rinard, “A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens”

Feb 18 (Miriam): *Problem of the Priors*  
Strevens Chapter 9  
Rinard, “The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability”

Feb 25 (Sinan): *The Problem of Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience*  
Strevens Chapter 11  
Elga and Rayo, “Fragmentation and Information Access”

March 4 (Miriam): *Intro to Epistemic Decision Theory*  
Titelbaum Chapter 10  
Carr, “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief”  
Titelbaum Chapter 7 (recommended especially for those not familiar with decision theory)  
Greaves, “Epistemic Decision Theory” (optional)  
Berker, “The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism” (optional)  
“Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions” (optional)

**Part II: Applications**

March 11: (Sinan) *Disagreement and Calibration*  
Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement”  
White, “On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers”

March 18: Spring Break

March 25 (Sinan and David Barnett): *Epistemic Circularity*  
Weisberg, “Bootstrapping in General”  
Barnett, “What’s the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?”

April 1 (Miriam and Brian Knab): *Fine Tuning*  
White, “Fine Tuning and Multiple Universes”  
Bradley, sections 1 and 2.2 of “Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief”  
Knab (Something Awesome)

April 8 (Sinan and Brian Miller): *Epistemology of Perception*  
White, “Problems for Dogmatism”  
Miller (Something Awesome)
April 15 (Sinan): *Epistemology of Perception, Cont’d*
  Pryor, “Problems for Credulism”
  Weisberg, sections 1, 4-7 of “Updating, Undermining and Independence”

April 22 (Miriam and Jason Konek): *Accuracy and Imprecise Credences*
  Schoenfield, “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences”
  Konek, “Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credences”

April 29 (Miriam): *Accuracy and Disagreement OR Accuracy and Permissivism OR Accuracy and Higher Order Evidence/Indexical Evidence*

*Accuracy and Disagreement*
  Moss, “Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise”
  Staffel, “Disagreement and Epistemic Utility Based Compromise”

*Accuracy and Permissivism*
  Horowitz, “Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals”
  Kelly, “Evidence can be Permissive”

*Accuracy and Higher Order Evidence/Indexical Evidence*
  TBD

May 6: Term Paper Presentations